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“– This is ridiculous. This has gone far enough. (...)
We’re in the middle of nowhere!
– There is no ‘middle of nowhere’ any more.”
Hard to use, hard to understand1, ‘[horror] museum’ even! –
PGP has no shortage of critics, under continuous assault now for about
two decades.
Its detractors emphasize perfect forward secrecy and deniability, among
others.
This publication aims to provide an entry point into these discussions.
It makes available a bibliography together with excerpts, notes and a
timeline.
In various places, terms such as “future secrecy” or “post-compromise
security” are found instead of forward secrecy, for example2; in others
“backtracking resistance” is used still instead3!
Elsewhere, we are assured that “asymmetric cryptography” has long
replaced the outdated category of “public-key cryptography”4, though
doubts remain as to whether this represents a true consensus...
—
These computer scientists seemingly cannot agree on a common ter-
minology, and have yet to do so. Their science, a young one...
These are some of the great debates of our times.
1The two former points are mentioned by Ian Goldberg for instance, as general challenges
of cryptography research, and properties of cryptographic systems, first. Soon the main target
however becomes obvious : PGP! (See Goldberg 2007.)
2They refer to the same property, as far as is known to us.
3Serious Cryptography.
4“Over time terminology has shifted: now public key cryptography is mostly called “asym-
metric cryptography” and public keys are more often called “public certificates”” (Hansen
2019).
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From PGP to OTRv4 (1991-2019)
∗1991 : Introduction of PGP (Phil Zimmermann). Proprietary.
∗1997 : Introduction of GPG (Werner Koch). Free software.
— Koch, Werner. 2007. “A Short History of the GNU Privacy Guard”.
“It’s been a decade now that the very first version of the GNU
Privacy Guard has been released. This very first version was
not yet known under the name of GnuPG but dubbed “g10” as
a reference on the German constitution article on freedom of
telecommunication (Grundgesetz Artikel 10) and as a pun on
the G-10 law which allows the secret services to bypass these
constitutional guaranteed freedoms.
Version 0.0.0 released on December 20th 1997, was a barely
working replacement of PGP avoiding all patented algorithm
by using Elgamal and Blowfish instead of RSA and IDEA.”
∗2004 : Introduction of OTR (Nikita Borisov, Eric Brewer, Ian Goldberg).
— Borisov, Nikita, Brewer, Eric and Goldberg, Ian. 2004. “Off-the-
Record Communication, or, Why Not To Use PGP”.
“Quite often on the Internet, cryptography is used to protect
private, personal communications. However, most commonly,
systems such as PGP are used, which use long-lived encryption
keys (subject to compromise) for confidentiality, and digital
signatures (which provide strong, and in some jurisdictions,
legal, proof of authorship) for authenticity.
In this paper, we argue that most social communications on-
line should have just the opposite of the above two properties;
namely, they should have perfect forward secrecy and repudia-
bility. We present a protocol for secure online communication,
called “off-the-record messaging”, which has properties better-
suited for casual conversation than do systems like PGP or
S/MIME. We also present an implementation of off-the-record
messaging as a plugin to the Linux GAIM instant messaging
client. Finally, we discuss how to achieve similar privacy for
high-latency communications such as email.”
— Goldberg, Ian. 2007. “Off-the-Record Messaging: Useful Security and
Privacy for IM”.
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∗2013/14 (?) : Introduction of Signal as TextSecure (Trevor Perrin, Moxie
Marlinspike).
“The TextSecure encrypted messaging protocol is derivative of
OTR Messaging. The major difference being the use of ECC
keys instead of standard DSA (...)”5
— Marlinspike, Moxie. 2014. “GPG And Me”.
“There just seems to be something particular about people who
try GPG and conclude that its a realistic path to introducing
private communication in their lives for casual correspondence
with strangers.”
— Green, Matthew. 2014. “What’s the matter with PGP?”.
“a museum of 1990s crypto”
Note : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew D. Green
∗2015 : ProPublica article reveals “one guy” is working on GPG, and that
person – Werner Koch – is “going broke”. To wide schock.
— Walfield, Neal. 2016. “Op-ed: Why I’m not giving up on PGP”.
“Signal can’t replace PGP.”
5Presumably elliptic curve cryptography and Digital Signature Algorithm respectively.
4
Note : Walfield is a former GPG contributor, currently working
on a new OpenPGP implementation called Sequoia (in Rust).
— Cohn-Gordon et al.. 2016. “A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal
Messaging Protocol”.
“The Signal protocol is a cryptographic messaging protocol
that provides end-to-end encryption for instant messaging in
WhatsApp, Wire, and Facebook Messenger among many oth-
ers, serving well over 1 billion active users. Signal includes
several uncommon security properties (such as “future secrecy”
or “post-compromise security”), enabled by a novel technique
called ratcheting in which session keys are updated with every
message sent. (...)
We conduct a formal security analysis of Signal’s initial ex-
tended triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH) key agreement and Dou-
ble Ratchet protocols as a multi-stage authenticated key ex-
change protocol. (...)
We have found no major flaws in the design (...) of this widely
adopted protocol. (...)
In this work we provided the first formal security analysis of
the cryptographic core of the Signal protocol.”
— Bini, Ola and Celi, Sofia. 2018. “No evidence of communication: Off-
The-Record Protocol version 4”.
“the 4th version of the OTR protocol provides stronger denia-
bility than all current secure messaging protocols in use, such
as OTRv3 and Signal. (...)
the purpose of OTRv4 is to provide an up-to-date protocol that
provides no convincing cryptographic evidence that a conver-
sation took place. (...) To achieve this property -known as
forgeability- we use XSalsa20”
— Gillmor, Daniel. 2019. “OpenPGP Certificate Flooding”.
“My public cryptographic identity has been spammed to the
point where it is unusable in standard workflows.”
Note : Debian contributor, ACLU technologist.
— Hansen, Robert. 2019. “SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack”.
“In the last week of June 2019 unknown actors deployed a cer-
tificate spamming attack against two high-profile contributors
in the OpenPGP community ([self] and Daniel Kahn Gillmor”
Note : GPG contributor.
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